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Abstract
In this paper we study the implications of contingent payments on the clearing wealth in a
network model of financial contagion. We consider an extension of the Eisenberg-Noe financial
contagion model in which the nominal interbank obligations depend on the wealth of the firms
in the network. We first consider the problem in a static framework and develop conditions for
existence and uniqueness of solutions as long as no firm is speculating on the failure of other
firms. In order to achieve existence and uniqueness under more general conditions, we introduce
a dynamic framework. We demonstrate how this dynamic framework can be applied to problems
that were ill-defined in the static framework.
1 Introduction
The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 proved the need to study and understand how failures
and losses spread through the financial system. This effect, in which the distress of one bank
puts the financial health of other banks in jeopardy, is called financial contagion. In an era
of globalization and tight interconnections among the various financial entities, this type of
contagion can spread rapidly causing a systemic crisis. Hence a thorough analysis of the different
factors and mechanisms are of paramount importance.
However, the 2007-2009 financial crisis proved that not just banks, but insurance companies
are also part of the financial system and hence linkages formed between banks and insurance
companies can act as potential channels of financial contagion. These linkages are formed and
resolved in a way that is different from normal bank loans. A typical example of such a linkage
is a credit default swap [CDS]. A credit default swap is a contract in which a buyer pays a
premium to a seller in order to protect itself against a potential loss due to the occurrence of
a credit event that affects the value of the contract’s underlying reference obligation, e.g., a
corporate or sovereign bond. The contract specifies the credit events that will trigger payment
from the seller to the buyer. Whereas such instruments can be used to hedge risks, they may
also be used for speculative purposes to put a short position on the credit markets.
The important role that such contingent linkages play is demonstrated by the financial crisis
of 2007-2009. As that crisis unfolded, AIG faced bankruptcy after the failure of Lehman Brothers
due to the large payouts it was required to make on its CDS contracts referencing Lehman and
mortgage backed securities. When the crisis hit, the sudden calls to pay out the CDS contracts
put great pressure on AIG, which traditionally had a thin capital base. Consequently AIG
had to be rescued by the U.S. Department of Treasury so as to avoid jeopardizing the financial
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health of firms which bought CDSs from AIG. However, despite the importance of these linkages,
current models are unable to account for the conditional payments that an insurance or credit
default swap contract would require. We refer to [8] for a preliminary study of the insurance
and reinsurance market.
Our modeling follows the setting of the seminal paper of [17]. That work proposes a weighted
graph to model the spread of defaults in the financial system. In this model, banks’ liabilities are
modeled through the edges. The banks use their liquid assets to pay off these liabilities; unpaid
liabilities may cause other banks to default as well. Under simple conditions, they provide
existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments and develop an algorithm for computing the
same. The base model of [17] has been extended in many directions to capture complexities
in the financial system: Bankruptcy costs have been explored in [19, 39, 18, 27, 5, 10], cross-
holdings in [19, 18, 5], extension to illiquid assets in [12, 36, 26, 3, 11, 5, 4, 21, 23, 22]. Empirical
studies on the spread of contagion has been done in [20, 42, 16, 27].
As far as the authors are aware, theoretical work on contingent payments and CDS in
relation to systemic risk has not been explored much. [40, 41] show that the clearing vector
in the presence of generalized CDS contracts is not well-defined and need not exist. They
further propose a static setting to model CDS payments and give sufficient conditions on the
network topology for existence of a clearing solution. [31] considers such a model in a static
framework and proposes a method to rewrite some classes of network topologies as an Eisenberg-
Noe system. [38, 15] modeled CDS payments, but most of the reference entities are required
to be external to the financial system. [29] modeled reinsurance networks and studied the
implications of network topologies on existence and uniqueness of the liabilities and clearing
payments. A different approach has been taken in [28] in which a stochastic setting is used to
analyze contagion caused by credit default swaps. The role of credit default swaps in causing
financial contagion has been captured in several empirical studies, see e.g. [37, 33].
The current work aims to provide a generalized theoretical framework in which to study
credit default swaps and other contingent payments in the Eisenberg-Noe setting. We focus on
existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments under contingent payments without presup-
posing the nature of those payments or strong assumptions on the network topology. This is in
contrast to the aforementioned literature on CDS network models in which there is no guarantee
that the realized networks would obey the required conditions. Hence it is paramount to de-
velop results for a general network, irrespective of the topology. We do this by first considering
the problem in a static framework where all claims are settled simultaneously. In such a set-
ting we find that uniqueness of the clearing solution follows so long as no firm is “speculating”
on another firm’s failure. However, with speculation the problem in a static setting no longer
satisfies the sufficient mathematical properties for uniqueness. In order to overcome this issue,
we introduce a dynamic framework. This setting ensures both existence and uniqueness of a
clearing solution under the usual conditions from [17]. This dynamic framework is similar to
the discrete time systems considered in [6, 9].
This work is organized in the following way: First, in Section 2, we will introduce the math-
ematical and financial setting. In Section 3, we develop the static framework for incorporating
contingent payments such as insurance and CDS, provide results on existence and develop condi-
tions for uniqueness that are intimately related to considerations of insurance versus speculation.
Further we demonstrate some shortcomings inherent to the static framework with contingent
payments. In Section 4, we introduce a discrete time dynamic framework and discuss existence
and uniqueness results. Additionally we demonstrate how this framework can be applied to
problems that were ill-defined in the static framework through numerical examples.
2 Background
We begin with some simple notation that will be consistent for the entirety of this paper. Let
x, y ∈ Rn for some positive integer n, then
x ∧ y = (min(x1, y1),min(x2, y2), . . . ,min(xn, yn))
⊤
,
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x− = −(x ∧ 0), and x+ = (−x)−.
Throughout this paper we will consider a network of n financial institutions. We will denote
the set of all banks in the network by N := {1, 2, . . . , n}. Often we will consider an additional
node 0, which encompasses the entirety of the financial system outside of the n banks; this node
0 will also be referred to as society or the societal node. The full set of institutions, including
the societal node, is denoted by N0 := N ∪ {0}. We refer to [25, 27] for further discussion of
the meaning and concepts behind the societal node.
We will be extending the model from [17] in this paper. In that work, any bank i ∈ N may
have obligations Lij ≥ 0 to any other firm or society j ∈ N0. We will assume that no firm has
any obligation to itself, i.e., Lii = 0 for all firms i ∈ N , and the society node has no liabilities
at all, i.e., L0j = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0. Thus the total liabilities for bank i ∈ N is given by
p¯i :=
∑
j∈N0
Lij ≥ 0 and relative liabilities πij :=
Lij
p¯i
if p¯i > 0 and arbitrary otherwise; for
simplicity, in the case that p¯i = 0, we will let πij =
1
n
for all j ∈ N0\{i} and πii = 0. On the
other side of the balance sheet, all firms are assumed to begin with some amount of assets xi ≥ 0
for all firms i ∈ N0. The resultant clearing payments, under a pro-rata payments environment,
satisfy the fixed point problem
p = p¯ ∧
(
x+Π⊤p
)
. (1)
That is, each bank pays the minimum of what it owes: p¯i and what it has: xi +
∑
j∈N πjipj .
The resultant vector of wealths for all firms is given by
V = x+Π⊤p− p¯. (2)
Noting that these payments can be written as a simple function of the wealths (p = [p¯−V −]+),
we provide the following proposition. We refer also to [43, 7, 6] for similar notions of utilizing
clearing wealth instead of clearing payments.
Proposition 2.1 (Proposition 2.1 of [6]). p ∈ [0, p¯] is a clearing payment in the Eisenberg-Noe
setting if and only if p = [p¯ − V −]+ for some V ∈ Rn+1 satisfying the following fixed point
problem
V = x+Π⊤[p¯− V −]+ − p¯. (3)
Vice versa, V ∈ Rn+1 is a clearing wealths if and only if V is defined as in (2) for some clearing
payments p ∈ [0, p¯] as defined in the fixed point problem (1).
Due to the equivalence of the clearing payments and clearing wealths provided in Proposi-
tion 2.1, we are able to consider the Eisenberg-Noe system as a fixed point of equity and losses
rather than payments.
In [17] results for the existence and uniqueness of the clearing payments (and thus for the
clearing wealths as well) are provided. In fact, it can be shown that there exists a unique clearing
solution in the Eisenberg-Noe framework so long as Li0 > 0 for all firms i ∈ N . We will take
advantage of this result later in this paper. This is a reasonable assumption (as discussed in,
e.g., [27, 25]) as obligations to society include, e.g., deposits to the banks.
Remark 2.2. The analysis presented in this paper can be extended to include illiquid assets as
discussed in, e.g., [12, 4, 21, 23], to include financial derivatives on illiquid assets. This would
allow for obligations to depend on the price of the illiquid assets, e.g., for hedging using put
options.
3 Simultaneous network clearing with contingent payments
3.1 General setting
Let us now consider the case when the nominal liabilities between financial institutions depend
explicitly on the wealths of the firms. This is, for instance, the case with insurance, credit
default swaps, reserve requirements with a central bank, or the default waterfall enacted by
central counterparties; see Examples 3.2-3.5 for more details of those cases.
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As a general setting, this corresponds to the situation in which the nominal liabilities Lij :
R
n+1 → R+ from bank i ∈ N to j ∈ N0 is a mapping from the vector of bank wealths into the
obligations; as mentioned above, we will assume that L0i ≡ 0 and Lii ≡ 0 for all firms i ∈ N .
That is, dependent on the actualized wealths V ∈ Rn+1 of all institutions in the system, the
nominal liabilities will adjust to be L(V ) ∈ R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ a nonnegative matrix with 0 diagonal.
In the case that the societal node is not desired, then this can be incorporated by setting Li0 ≡ 0
for all i ∈ N . Thus we consider a static setting for these contingent payments, i.e., we assume
all claims are resolved simultaneously and the nominal liabilities L account for all layers of
contingent claims.
Assumption 3.1. The nominal liabilities Lij : R
n+1 → R+ are bounded with upper bound
L¯ij ≥ 0 for all institutions i, j ∈ N0.
Example 3.2. Consider a static network model of external assets x ∈ Rn+1+ and liabilities
L0 ∈ R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ (with corresponding total liabilities p¯
0 and relative liabilities Π0). Firm
j ∈ N0 purchased an insurance contract from firm i ∈ N on the event that firm k ∈ N does not
pay its obligations in full to firm j; this is encoded in the nominal liabilities function
Lij(V ) = L
0
ij +
∑
k∈N
ηkij(V )
Lkj(V )∑
l∈N0
Lkl(V )
V −k .
In the above equation we set the parameter ηkij : R
n+1 → [0, 1] to denote the level of insurance
offered by the contract. Logically we impose the condition that ηiij ≡ 0 for all firms i ∈ N and
j ∈ N0 so as a firm is not insuring against itself. We further impose a tree structure on the
insurance, that is insurers will not directly insure nonpayments from other insurers in a cyclical
manner. This is codified in the condition that ηk1ij η
k2
k1j
. . . ηikmj = 0 for all i, j, k1, · · · , km ∈
N0. This tree structure immediately implies the uniqueness of the nominal liabilities matrix
L : Rn+1 → R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ . These conditions are related to the “green core” system in [40]. In
the case that ηkij(V ) > 1, this is the situation of over-insurance which no longer is considered
“insurance” in the strict legal sense; see Example 3.3 for this more general setting. More
generally, over-insurance is implied by the condition
∑
i∈N η
k
ij(V ) > 1, i.e., the total amount
of insurance on any payment should be bounded by 1. Though explained as a single insurance
contract, multiple such contracts may be layered so that one financial institution may have
insurance against the failures of multiple counterparties. The simplest insurance contracts are
such that ηkij ≡ ηˆ
k
ij ∈ [0, 1], though by considering the functional we allow for situations in which
insurance only pays losses exceeding a threshold τkij , e.g.,
ηkij(V ) = ηˆ
k
ij
[
Lkj(V )−
Lkj(V )∑
l∈N0
Lkl(V )
V −k + τ
k
ij
]+
[
Lkj(V )−
Lkj(V )∑
l∈N0
Lkl(V )
V −k
]+ .
Also within this framework we allow for reinsurance contracts; that is, insurance contracts that
pay out once payments from an insurer reach a certain threshold so as to contain the losses for
the insurer itself.
Example 3.3. As in Example 3.2, consider an initial static network model with asset and
liability parameters (x, L0). Though similar to an insurance policy, a firm may purchase credit
default swaps. Firm j ∈ N0 purchased a credit default swap [CDS] from firm i ∈ N on the
failure of firm k ∈ N is encoded in the formula
Lij(V ) = L
0
ij +
∑
k∈N
ηkij(V )V
−
k .
In this example we define ηkij : R
n+1 → R+ without restriction on the number of swaps purchased
or the existence of an insurable interest. In such a way we allow for so-called “naked” CDSs
where the payments to firm j are not based on any insurable interest in firm k.
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Example 3.4. As in Example 3.2, consider an initial static network model with asset and
liability parameters (x, L0). We will now consider a system in which all firms must pay towards
a centralized stability fund. That is, prior to the start some amount y ∈ [0, x] of the external
assets are provided from each firm used in the stability fund. In the case of failures this fund
would support the defaulting firms. Consider this centralized fund to be denoted as node B and
let NB = N0 ∪{B}. This system can be described in which the bailout fund is capitalized prior
to clearing or as part of clearing. If the bailout is collected prior to clearing than this system is
described by external assets of xi − yi ≥ 0 for all firms i ∈ N and
∑
i∈N yi ≥ 0 for the stability
fund node B and liabilities of
Lij(V ) = L
0
ij ∀i, j ∈ N0, LBi(V ) = V
−
i ∀i ∈ N , LiB(V ) = 0 ∀i ∈ N .
The payments to this stability fund can also be made as a part of clearing. In this case the
external assets are x and liabilities are
Lij(V ) = L
0
ij ∀i, j ∈ N0, LBi(V ) = V
−
i ∀i ∈ N , LiB(V ) = yi ∀i ∈ N .
This can be extended further by setting the payments to the stability fund y to itself be a
function of the wealth of each institution. This allows for concepts such as pooled reserve
requirements to be encoded into our general framework.
Example 3.5. The final general conceptual example we wish to present is the situation of
introducing a central counterparty [CCP]. In this setting, the network topology follows a star
shape, i.e., firms only have liabilities to and from some centralized CCP node. The true CCP
rules, however, also include what is called a default waterfall. The default waterfall kicks in
when the CCP is unable to pay out in full through the initial collected liabilities and margin
payments. In such a case the remaining solvent firms are forced to provide more liquidity to the
CCP node. In a broad sense, this fits within the general framework considered herein as the
obligations to the CCP are directly dependent on the wealths of all firms in the system. CCPs
are described in more detail in [1, 35, 13, 15].
As in the construction of the Eisenberg-Noe setting [17], the total and relative liabilities will
implicitly be functions of the system wealths as well, i.e.,
p¯i(V ) =
∑
j∈N0
Lij(V ) (4)
πij(V ) =


Lij(V )
p¯i(V )
if p¯i(V ) > 0
1
n
if p¯i(V ) = 0, i 6= j
0 if p¯i(V ) = 0, i = j
(5)
for firms i, j ∈ N0 and system equities V ∈ Rn+1.
With this contingent setting we can define the extension of the Eisenberg-Noe framework as
the fixed point problem
V = x+Π(V )⊤[p¯(V )− V −]+ − p¯(V ). (6)
That is, the wealths are the sum of external assets and payments from other banks minus the
payments owed. This could equivalently be defined directly as the payments as is done in [17],
we choose to consider the wealths directly in this work as it is easier to consider the examples,
e.g., insurance payments. The realized payments can be defined (as discussed previously without
contingent payments) by p = [p¯(V )− V −]+.
Proposition 3.6. Under Assumption 3.1, any fixed point wealth V ∈ Rn+1 of (6) lies within
the compact set
∏n
i=1[xi −
∑
j∈N0
L¯ij , xi +
∑
j∈N L¯ji].
Proof. The result is immediate by the boundedness properties of Assumption 3.1.
Corollary 3.7. Under Assumption 3.1, there exists an equilibrium wealth of (6) if Lij : R
n+1 →
R+ is continuous as a function of wealths for all firms i, j ∈ N0.
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Proof. This follows from the compactness argument of Proposition 3.6 and the Brouwer fixed
point theorem.
Though in Corollary 3.7 we have proven the existence of an equilibrium solution to (6), this
need not be a unique solution. The following example illustrates a simple network with multiple
equilibria. Further, Corollary 3.7 and (6) implicitly assume that there are no bankruptcy costs.
With such costs (as introduced in [39]), Corollary 3.7 will no longer apply. See also Remark 3.12
for a discussion on sufficient conditions to guarantee existence of a clearing wealths vector under
bankruptcy costs.
Example 3.8. Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node. This
network is depicted in Figure 1. Banks 1 and 3 have x1 = x3 = 0 external assets and bank 2
begins with x2 = 3/16 external assets. We consider the case in which L23 = L32 ≡ 1 are fixed
obligations whereas the first bank has purchased a credit default swap on the third institution
defaulting on its obligations from the second institution that pays out L21(V ) = V
−
3 . No other
exposures exist within this system. The system of wealths must therefore satisfy
V1 =
V −3
1 + V −3
(1 + V −3 − V
−
2 )
+
V2 =
3
16
+ (1− V −3 )
+ − (1 + V −3 )
V3 =
1
1 + V −3
(1 + V −3 − V
−
2 )
+ − 1.
It can be shown that the following are both equilibrium wealths of the contingent network:
• V = (0 , 3/16 , 0)⊤, i.e., payments are given by p = p¯(V )− V − = (0 , 1 , 1)⊤, and
• V = (3/16 , −21/16 , −3/4)⊤, i.e., payments are given by p = p¯(V )−V − = (0 , 7/16 , 1/4)⊤.
x1 = 0 x2 =
3
16
x3 = 0
L21(V ) = V
−
3
L23 ≡ 1
L32 ≡ 1
Figure 1: Example 3.8: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks which accepts
more than one clearing solution.
3.2 A nonspeculative financial network
We will now impose additional properties upon the financial system to have stronger existence
results, culminating in uniqueness of the clearing solutions. These results provide monotonicity
of the wealth of the banks in the financial system. The first of such properties, defined as a
nonspeculative property, is provided below in Definition 3.9.
Definition 3.9. Firm i ∈ N0 is called nonspeculative if
xi +
∑
j∈N
πji(V )[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+ − p¯i(V )
is nondecreasing in V ∈ Rn+1. The network N0 is called nonspeculative if all firms i ∈ N0 are
nonspeculative.
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We call the property in Definition 3.9 “nonspeculative” as it provides conditions so that firm
i ∈ N0 does not benefit from (i.e., speculate on) the failure of another firm. We do, however,
allow for firm i to hedge its exposure to other firms. This exposure can be either direct or
indirect.
Remark 3.10. The nonspeculative framework considered herein is similar to, and can be con-
sidered as an extension of the properties considered in [40]. In that work, the monotonicity
property, in the definition of nonspeculative systems that we consider, is specified for credit
default swaps. Properties on solutions, which we will derive from this nonspeculative property,
are considered as a function of the network topology in [40]; in fact, the topological features
required in [40] guarantee that the “green core” system is inherently nonspeculative.
Lemma 3.11. Under Assumption 3.1, any nonspeculative system has a greatest and least equi-
librium wealth V ↑ ≥ V ↓ satisfying (6) existing within the compact space
∏
i∈N0
[xi−
∑
j∈N0
L¯ij , xi+∑
j∈N L¯ji]. Additionally, under all clearing vectors the value of the equity of each node of the
financial system is the same, that is, if V and Vˆ are any two clearing wealths then V + = Vˆ +.
Proof. By the nonspeculative property we can apply the Tarski fixed point theorem to get the
existence of a maximal and minimal fixed point V ↑ ≥ V ↓. By Proposition 3.6 we have that such
solutions must exist within the provided compact space.
Now we will show the uniqueness of the positive equities by proving that (V ↑)+ = (V ↓)+.
By definition we know that (V ↑)+ ≥ (V ↓)+, so as in [17, Theorem 1] we will prove that the
total positive equity in the system remains constant. Let V ∈ Rn+1 be some equilibrium wealth
solution, then since p¯0 ≡ 0 by definition we recover that
∑
i∈N0
V +i =
∑
i∈N0

xi + ∑
j∈N
πji(V )[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+ − p¯i(V )


+
=
∑
i∈N0

xi + ∑
j∈N
πji(V )[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+ − [p¯i(V )− V
−
i ]
+


=
∑
i∈N0
xi +
∑
j∈N
[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+
∑
i∈N0
πji(V )−
∑
i∈N0
[p¯i(V )− V
−
i ]
+
=
∑
i∈N0
xi +
∑
j∈N
[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+ −
∑
i∈N0
[p¯i(V )− V
−
i ]
+
=
∑
i∈N0
xi.
Therefore
∑
i∈N0
(V ↑i )
+ =
∑
i∈N0
(V ↓i )
+ and thus (V ↑)+ = (V ↓)+.
Remark 3.12. The inclusion of bankruptcy costs to this setting, in much the same way as
accomplished in [39, 40], would guarantee the existence of a maximal and minimal clearing
wealths vector under the assumptions of Lemma 3.11. Much as in [40], without the nonspec-
ulative assumption, existence of a solution may not exist since Corollary 3.7 will no longer
apply.
We will now give additional properties for the societal node 0 to satisfy.
Assumption 3.13. All firms i ∈ N have strictly positive obligations to society, i.e., Li0 :
R
n+1 → R++. Additionally, the obligations to society depend only on the negative wealths of all
firms, i.e., Li0(V ) = Li0(−V −) for all i ∈ N .
Definition 3.14. The societal node is called strictly nonspeculative if∑
j∈N
πj0(V )[p¯j(V )− V
−
j ]
+
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is strictly increasing in V ∈ Rn+1− . The network N0 is called strictly nonspeculative if the system
is nonspeculative and the societal node is strictly nonspeculative.
We call this property strictly nonspeculative since it provides the condition that society does
strictly worse as any firm defaults by any additional amount. This requires that society can
never perfectly hedge its risk, and as a consequence is strictly not speculating on any firm’s
failure. This is a reasonable property as society should always be exposed to banking failures
to some degree through, e.g., deposits and the payments necessary for deposit insurance.
Corollary 3.15. Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.13, any strictly nonspeculative system has a
unique equilibrium wealth of (6) existing within the compact space
∏
i∈N0
[xi −
∑
j∈N0
L¯ij , xi +∑
j∈N L¯ji].
Proof. Using Lemma 3.11 we have the existence of greatest and least fixed points V ↑ ≥ V ↓.
Let us assume there exists some firm i ∈ N such that 0 > V ↑i > V
↓
i (otherwise uniqueness is
guaranteed by nonexistence of such a firm as well as the uniqueness of the positive equities).
By the definition of the equilibrium wealth of the society node
V ↑0 =
∑
j∈N
πj0(V
↑)[p¯j(V
↑)− (V ↑j )
−]+
>
∑
j∈N
πj0(V
↓)[p¯j(V
↓)− (V ↓j )
−]+ = V ↓0 .
However, immediately we know that the societal node has positive equity, therefore by Lemma
3.11 it must follow that V ↑0 = V
↓
0 , which is a contradiction so uniqueness must follow.
We will now provide a version of the fictitious default algorithm (as discussed in, e.g., [17,
39, 4, 21, 5]) for the contingent payments described in (6). Algorithm 3.16 provides the maximal
fixed point V ↑ under the conditions of Lemma 3.11, that is, for a network of nonspeculative
banks. It can easily be modified to provide the minimal fixed point V ↓ instead. Under the
assumptions of Corollary 3.15 this algorithm results in the unique equilibrium wealths.
Algorithm 3.16. Consider the setting of Lemma 3.11 such that L(V ) = L(−V −) for every
V ∈ Rn+1. The greatest clearing wealths V ↑ can be found in at most n iterations of the following
algorithm. Initialize k = 0, D0 = ∅, and V 0 = x+Π(0)⊤p¯(0)− p¯(0).
1. Increment k = k + 1;
2. Denote the set of insolvent banks by Dk = {i ∈ N | V k−1i < 0};
3. If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate;
4. Define the matrix Λ ∈ {0, 1}(n+1)×(n+1) so that
Λij =
{
1 if i = j ∈ Dk
0 else
;
5. V k = Vˆ is the maximal solution of the following fixed point problem:
Vˆ = x+Π(ΛVˆ )⊤[p¯(ΛVˆ ) + ΛVˆ ]+ − p¯(ΛVˆ )
in the domain
∏
i∈N0
[xi −
∑
j∈N0
L¯ij , xi +
∑
j∈N L¯ji];
6. Go back to step 1.
In Algorithm 3.16 at most n iterations are needed, as opposed to n+1 as would generally be
stated for the fictitious default algorithm of [17]. This is due to the fact that, by definition, the
societal node 0 has no obligations and therefore cannot default. The additional condition that
L(V ) = L(−V −) for Algorithm 3.16 corresponds to the case in which the nominal liabilities only
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depend on the set of solvent institutions and the shortfall of each insolvent institution. This is
satisfied for, e.g., CDSs as described in Example 3.3.
We now consider a simple sensitivity analysis of the clearing wealths V under uncertainty
in the initial endowments x ∈ Rn+1+ . In so doing we are able to consider similar comparative
statics results as in Lemma 5 of [17].
Proposition 3.17. Consider the setting of Corollary 3.15 such that the nominal liabilities
Lij : R
n+1 → R+ are continuous for every pair of firms i, j ∈ N0. The unique clearing wealths
V : Rn+1+ → R
n+1 are continuous and nondecreasing as a function of the initial endowments
x ∈ Rn+1+ .
Proof. The proof is presented in the appendix.
3.3 Shortcomings
We wish to conclude our discussion of the system with contingent obligations under simultaneous
claims by considering shortfalls to this approach. In the subsequent section we will consider a
dynamic approach to overcome these shortcomings, as well the issues on existence and uniqueness
considered above and by [40, 41].
Consider a setting in which a firm takes out an insurance contract on its own failure. This
setting is of particular interest as it is inherently the type of contingent payment owed to a central
counterparty as part of the default waterfall in the CCP framework considered in Example 3.5
or the stability fund discussed in Example 3.4. To further simplify this setting, and again to
make it relevant with regards to the CCP framework, we will consider the case in which the
firm(s) offering insurance have enough assets to make all payments in full. Allow the firm taking
out the insurance contracts to be firm 1. If the sum total of all contingent payments are exactly
enough to make firm 1 whole again, i.e., all contingent payments to firm 1 sum up to V −1 , then
in principle firm 1 will never default. However, in equilibrium, this is not what the insurance
payments will be; in fact, if the insurance payments in a fixed point were to make firm 1 whole
then no insurance payments would be made and the initial shortfall would be realized once
more. Therefore, in equilibrium, it must be the case that firm 1 will default even if they are
paid the insurance. As a simple demonstrative example, if firm 1 only has obligations to the
societal node (allowing for us to ignore all feedback effects from firm 1 paying more and having
a higher recovery rate through the network) then the insurance will add up to exactly half of
firm 1’s initial shortfall in the fixed point as the new shortfall for firm 1 will be equal to the
contingent payments that are being made.
However, while this conceptual problem with a firm taking out an insurance contract on its
own losses is important, it can conceivably be overcome by providing a sufficiently complicated
structure to the contingent payments. A more subtle, but pernicious, flaw is that this contingent
payment system is speculative by construction. Namely, if the wealth of firm 1 is lowered, no
other firm does better (firm 1 will pay out less and the insurance companies will have higher
claims to pay), but firm 1 itself improves its wealth. This is due to the nonspeculative property
being constructed in which firm 1 does not directly get hit by its own lower wealth, but would
only occur in network effects that would be on the second order, not in evidence in the single
iteration of the definition. Thus, even though the network is constructed from the notion that
no firm benefits in the case of defaults (and this would be evidenced in any equilibrium), the
monotonicity of the nonspeculative property is a stronger construct that cannot be satisfied so
easily from a conceptual standpoint.
The above described problems could, in specific circumstances (e.g., a single insurer and
only one contingent payment contract or a “green core” system from [40]), be overcome by
reformulating the payments appropriately. However, in the general case with each contract
incorporating no speculation from a financial perspective, this system would have the aforemen-
tioned shortcomings. These challenges, along with the inability to deal with speculative systems
in general, stem from structural issues in such a static framework. Specifically, insurance, and
contingent payments more generally, are paid on specific claims, not simultaneous to the claim
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being made. This necessitates a dynamic approach to this problem, which we will discuss in the
subsequent section.
4 Dynamic Framework
As detailed above, the static, simultaneous claims, model presented has both mathematical and
economic issues that the authors are not aware of any way to overcome in a general setting.
These problems are associated with the presence of, potentially, infinite cycles. Much as with
[30], these cycles could alternate between two states, particularly for speculative systems. That
is, for instance, insurance is paid out because a bank is insolvent, but because of this insurance
payment the firm is no longer insolvent and no payment would be necessary. As in [30], we will
consider an algorithmic approach to this issue. We thus propose a simple dynamic framework.
Additionally, we consider this setting to be more realistic than the static setting considered
above and by [40] as the financial system does not include the payment of, e.g., a CDS on the
obligation inherent in that contract.
4.1 General Setting
We adapt the framework introduced in [6] for the purposes of constructing a simple dynamic
framework for contingent payments. Consider a discrete set of clearing times T, e.g., T =
{0, 1, . . . , T } for some (finite) terminal time T < ∞ or T = N. For processes we will use the
notation from [14] such that the process Z : T→ Rn has value of Z(t) at time t ∈ T and history
Zt := (Z(s))
t
s=0. As an explicit extension to [6], we consider the external (incoming) cash flow
x : T × R(n+1)×|T| → Rn+1+ and nominal liabilities L : T × R
(n+1)×|T| → R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ to be
functions of the clearing time and prior wealths. For simplicity, we will consider x(t, ·) := x(t)
to be independent of the prior wealths, though it may still depend on time. The distinguishing
feature of this model compared to the static Eisenberg-Noe model (or the static contingent
payment model above and in [40]) is that the system parameters may depend on prior times.
For example, if firm i has positive equity at time t − 1 (i.e., Vi(t − 1) > 0) then these surplus
assets are available to firm i at time t in order to satisfy its obligations. In the contingent
setting, the wealths of all banks at time t− 1 may affect the obligations due at time t as well.
We note that in [6] all unpaid obligations from a prior time are assumed to roll forward
automatically. That is, if firm i has negative wealth at time t− 1 then the debts that the firm
has not yet paid will roll forward in time and be due at the next time point. Under such an
assumption, no firm is deemed to default on its obligations until the terminal time T . Herein,
with the explicit consideration of the contingent payments, we may “zero out” a firm before
the terminal date if it is deemed to default in much the same as in, e.g., [9]. While we can
incorporate the notion of loans from [9] as well, we will restrict our analysis to debts rolling
forward in time so as to simplify the discussion.
As noted above, in addition to the structure from [6], the nominal liabilities will explicitly
depend on the clearing wealths of the prior time(s), i.e., L : T × R(n+1)×|T| → R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ .
Often, to make this difference explicit especially in examples, we consider the full nominal
liabilities L to be a combination of two components: a non-contingent component L0 : T →
R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ which is only a function of clearing times and a contingent component L
c : T ×
R
(n+1)×|T| → R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ which is a function of both the clearing times and the past history
(but only encodes the contingent payments based on the past history). That is, L = L0 + Lc.
As a descriptive consideration of the contingent obligations Lc, consider the insurance-based
(Example 3.2) or credit default swap (Example 3.3) scenarios of the previous section. For
instance, a bank j may purchase a credit default swap from bank i on the failure of firm k as
described in Example 3.3. As opposed to the simultaneous claims setting in Section 3, in this
dynamic setting we consider an order of operations. That is, first firm k must fail at time t− 1,
and only then would the credit default swap be paid at time t. This delay in payments is a
reflection of the real financial system in which there is a time between a claim being made by
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bank j to i and the payment on that claim. The payment due to this credit default swap would
be incorporated in Lcij but not L
0
ij .
Even with this important distinction, we can use the same methodology as in [6] to prove
existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths in this setting. The following assumption, with
the concept taken from [6] guarantees that all firms are solvent at the start of the system and
that the system is a regular network as described by [17].
Assumption 4.1. Before the time of interest, all firms are solvent and liquid. That is, Vi(−1) ≥
0 for all firms i ∈ N0. Additionally, all firms have positive external cash flow or obligations to
society at all times t ∈ T, i.e., xi(t) + Li0(t) > 0 for all firms i ∈ N and all times t ∈ T.
To incorporate the possibility of firms defaulting before the terminal time, let N t0(Vt−1) ⊆ N0
denote the firms that are paying obligations at time t ∈ T based on the history of wealths up
to time t − 1. In particular, we will assume that N 00 (V−1) := N0 and N
t+1
0 (Vt) ⊆ N
t
0(Vt−1)
for any time t and any wealths process V . That is, all firms are deemed solvent at time 0 as
in Assumption 4.1 and no firm recovers from default. This notion allows for a consideration in
much the same manner as [9]. Mathematically this does not require further consideration than
in [6] as N t0 only depends on the history up to time t − 1. With this notation we can define
Lij(t, Vt−1) = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 and i 6∈ N t0(Vt−1). With the notion of an auction from [9] it
will also follow that Lji(t, Vt−1) = 0 for all firms j ∈ N0 and i 6∈ N
t
0(Vt−1). We define the total
liabilities and relative liabilities at time t ∈ T as
p¯i(t, Vt−1) :=
∑
j∈N0
Lij(t, Vt−1) + Vi(t− 1)
−
πij(t, Vt−1) :=


Lij(t,Vt−1)+πij(t−1,Vt−2)Vi(t−1)
−
p¯i(t,Vt−1)
if p¯i(t, Vt−1) > 0
1
n
if p¯i(t, Vt−1) = 0, j 6= i
0 if p¯i(t, Vt−1) = 0, j = i
∀i, j ∈ N0.
Then the clearing wealths must satisfy the following fixed point problem in time t wealths:
V (t) = V (t−1)++x(t)+Π(t, Vt−1)
⊤ diag(1{i∈N t
0
(Vt−1)})
[
p¯(t, Vt−1)− V (t)
−
]+
− p¯(t, Vt−1). (7)
We proceed to reformulate the problem as in [6]. We consider a process of cash flows c and
functional relative exposures A. These we define by
c(t, Vt−1) := x(t) + L(t, Vt−1)
⊤~1− L(t, Vt−1)~1
aij(t, Vt) :=
{
πij(t, Vt−1) if p¯i(t, Vt−1) ≥ Vi(t)−, i ∈ N t0(Vt−1)
Lij(t,Vt−1)+aij(t−1,Vt−1)Vi(t−1)
−
Vi(t)−
else
∀i, j ∈ N0.
(8)
That is, we consider c(t, Vt−1) ∈ R
n+1 to be the vector of book capital levels at time t,
i.e., the new wealth of each firm assuming all other firms pay in full. We can also consider
ci(t, Vt−1) to be the net cash flow for firm i at time t. We define the functional matrix
A : T×R(n+1)×|T| → [0, 1](n+1)×(n+1) to be the relative exposure matrix. That is, aij(t, Vt)Vi(t)−
provides the (negative) impact that firm i’s losses have on firm j’s wealth at time t ∈ T. This
is in contrast to Π, the relative liabilities, in that it endogenously imposes the limited expo-
sures concept. This equivalent formulation provides mathematical simplicity to the analysis. A
broader discussion of this reformulation is provided in [6].
Thus the fixed point equation reduces to
V (t) = V (t− 1) + c(t, Vt−1)−A(t, Vt)
⊤V (t)− +A(t− 1, Vt−1)
⊤V (t− 1)−. (9)
With this setup we now wish to extend the existence and uniqueness results of [17] to discrete
time.
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Corollary 4.2. Let (c, L) : T× R(n+1)×|T| → Rn+1 × R
(n+1)×(n+1)
+ define a dynamic financial
network such that every bank has cash flow at least at the level dictated by nominal interbank
liabilities, i.e., ci(t, Vt−1) ≥
∑
j∈N Lji(t, Vt−1) −
∑
j∈N0
Lij(t, Vt−1) for all times t ∈ T and all
wealth processes V , and so that every bank owes to the societal node at all times t ∈ T, i.e.,
Li0(t, Vt−1) > 0 for all banks i ∈ N , times t ∈ T, and wealths V . Under Assumption 4.1, there
exists a unique solution of clearing wealths V : T→ Rn+1 to (9).
Proof. This follows directly from the proof of Theorem 3.2 of [6].
With the construction of the existence and uniqueness of the solution, we now want to
emphasize the fictitious default algorithm from [17] to construct this clearing wealths vector
over time. This algorithm is nearly identical to that presented in [6]. We note that at each
time t this algorithm takes at most n iterations as is the case for the fictitious default algorithm
originally presented in [17]. Thus with a terminal time T , this algorithm will construct the full
clearing solution over T in nT iterations.
Algorithm 4.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 4.2, the clearing wealths process V : T→
R
n+1 can be found by the following algorithm. Initialize t = −1 and V (−1) ≥ 0 as a given.
Repeat until t = maxT:
1. Increment t = t+ 1.
2. Initialize k = 0, V 0 = V (t− 1) + c(t, Vt−1), and D0 = ∅. Repeat until convergence:
(a) Increment k = k + 1;
(b) Denote the set of illiquid banks by Dk :=
{
i ∈ N t0(Vt−1) | V
k−1
i < 0
}
.
(c) If Dk = Dk−1 then terminate and set V (t) = V k−1.
(d) Define the matrix Λk ∈ {0, 1}n×n so that Λkij =
{
1 if i = j ∈ Dk
0 else
.
(e) Define V k = (I−Π(t, Vt−1)⊤Λk)−1
(
V (t− 1) + c(t, Vt−1) +A(t− 1, Vt−1)⊤V (t− 1)−
)
.
As in [6], in step (2e) of the fictitious default algorithm we are able to replace A(t, Vt) with
Π(t, Vt−1). This is beneficial as it allows us to directly compute V
k without requiring a fixed
point problem. We additionally note that the inclusion of defaulted banks only required the
change that the fictitious set of illiquid banks is a subset of N t0(Vt−1) at each time t.
Remark 4.4. The dynamic framework provides a flexible way to deal with contingent payments.
In particular, we can have as many time steps as the number of contingent payment layers in
the network. For example, to consider insurance we need to have two time points to incorporate
the nominal claims and the insurance claims triggered by the clearing of these nominal claims.
For reinsurance markets, we need three time steps, the third one to incorporate the reinsurance
claims triggered by the clearing of the insurance claims. We feel this hierarchical resolution of
the claims is widely observed in reality.
Remark 4.5. One of the advantages of the dynamic framework is that it provides a natural
way to include bankruptcy costs. This is a deviation from the static framework where we might
not have existence of solutions for bankruptcy costs. However in the dynamic framework we
can always determine the time point when the equity of a bank reaches zero and include the
bankruptcy costs for the successive time periods. Hence the solution will exist and be unique.
Remark 4.6. We can provide much stronger sensitivity results in this case, as compared to
the static case. Since in this approach at every time step we get an Eisenberg-Noe system, the
sensitivity results are a sequential application of Section 4 of [17]. Directional derivatives of the
static Eisenberg-Noe approach have been considered in [32, 24].
We wish to finish this section by remarking on when the dynamic framework presented herein
will provide a clearing solution from the simultaneous claim setting in the prior section.
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Remark 4.7. In general, the clearing solutions of the simultaneous claims framework will not
coincide with the terminal clearing wealths of the dynamic framework. These notions will,
however, coincide if the relative liabilities are kept constant as a function of wealths and time.
For a more detailed discussion see Section 5 of [6]. Other settings, as evidenced by the examples
provided in the next section, may provide sufficient conditions for the dynamic framework to
provide a clearing solution from the simultaneous clearing setting. In particular, this will occur
if the contingent payments do not strongly feedback into the network itself, e.g. if insurance
is owed to an already solvent firm. However, we want to emphasize that the conditions under
which the static and dynamic solutions coincide are very restrictive and in general this will not
be the case. This is appropriate given the shortcomings of the static setting as expressed in
Section 3.3.
4.2 Examples
We now wish to provide three illustrative examples to demonstrate the value of the discrete
time setting as a model over the static setting presented in Section 3. These three examples
correspond to simple networks in which the static setting has no clearing wealths, has multiple
clearing wealths, and has a poor interpretation of the clearing wealths respectively. We will
show that in all three situations the discrete time model presented above provides a unique
clearing wealth for which the interpretation of the results is as anticipated.
Example 4.8. We wish to consider a small network example in which the financial system
does not admit a clearing solution in the static setting, but a unique and financially meaningful
solution in the dynamic setting. In this case we will consider a digital CDS. That is, in the case
the CDS is triggered, the payment is a fixed strictly positive value (herein set to be 1), otherwise
it pays out nothing. Immediately we can see that this is not a continuous payout and therefore
does not automatically provide a clearing solution in the static setting (see Corollary 3.7),
however we will still need to prove that there does not exist any solution.
Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node, depicted in Figure
2. That is, bank 1 begins with x1 = 1, bank 2 with x2 = 0, and bank 3 with x3 = 2 in external
assets. We consider the case in which L12 ≡ 2 and L23 ≡ 1.5 are fixed obligations whereas the
first bank has purchased a digital credit default swap on the second institution defaulting on its
obligations from the third institution, i.e. L31(V ) = 1{V2<0}. No other exposures exist within
this system. The system of wealths must therefore satisfy
V1 = 1 + (1{V2<0} − V
−
3 )
+ − 2
V2 = (2− V
−
1 )
+ − 1.5
V3 = 2 + (1.5− V
−
2 )
+ − 1{V2<0}.
To show that no clearing solution exists to this system, we will consider the two possible settings:
bank 2 is solvent or bank 2 has negative wealth.
1. Assume bank 2 is solvent, i.e. 1{V2<0} = 0. We can compute a unique solution to the
clearing wealths V = (−1,−0.5, 3)⊤. However, since this violates our assumption that
V2 ≥ 0, this cannot be a clearing solution to the full problem.
2. Assume bank 2 is insolvent, i.e. 1{V2<0} = 1. We can compute a unique solution to
the clearing wealths V = (0, 0.5, 2.5)⊤. However, since this violates our assumption that
V2 < 0, this cannot be a clearing solution to the full problem.
As no other possible clearing solutions can exist, it must be the case that there does not exist
a clearing solution to this static financial system.
Now we wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T =
{0, 1}. Here we will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define xǫ(0) = (ǫ, 0, 1)⊤ and xǫ(1) = (1− ǫ, 0, 1)⊤ for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, by the
topology of this network, it is a regular network (as defined in [17]) for any choice of ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
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x1 = 1 x2 = 0 x3 = 2
L12 ≡ 2 L23 ≡ 1.5
L31(V ) = 1{V2<0}
Figure 2: Example 4.8: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks which has
no clearing in a static setting.
as required by Assumption 4.1. In any scenario, define L12(0) = 2 and L23(0) = 1.5 with no
other obligations at time 0. The only new obligation owed at time 1 is the contingent payment
from bank 3 to 1, i.e., L31(1, V0) = 1{V2(0)<0} with no other new obligations at time 1. Further,
all scenarios will be assumed to start from zero wealths (thus satisfying Assumption 4.1). We
can easily compute the unique clearing wealths under xǫ (assuming no firms are removed from
the system) as V ǫ(0) = (ǫ − 2, ǫ − 1.5, ǫ + 1)⊤ and (noting that V ǫ2 (0) < 0 for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1])
V ǫ(1) = (0, 0.5, 2.5)⊤. We note that this clearing solution is identical to the proposed static
wealths under the assumption that bank 2 is insolvent. Additionally, the final wealths are
independent of the choice of ǫ.
Example 4.9. Consider again Example 3.8 with three banks. In the static solution this was
encoded by the parameters: external assets of x = (0, 3/16, 0)⊤ and sparse liabilities provided
by L23 = L32 ≡ 1 and L21(V ) = V
−
3 . Two clearing solutions existed, V
∗ = (0, 3/16, 0)⊤ and
V ∗ = (3/16,−21/16,−3/4)⊤.
Now we wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T =
{0, 1}. Here we will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define xǫ(0) = (0, ǫ, 0)⊤ and xǫ(1) = (0, 3/16−ǫ, 0)⊤ for any ǫ ∈ (0, 3/16] to guarantee
the uniqueness of the clearing solutions as a regular network from [17] (and as required from
Assumption 4.1 and since no societal node is included in this example). In any scenario, define
L23(0) = L32(0) ≡ 1 with no other obligations at time 0. The only new obligation owed at
time 1 is the contingent payment from bank 2 to 1, i.e., L21(1, V0) = V3(0)
− with no other new
obligations at time 1. Further, all scenarios will be assumed to start from zero wealths (thus
satisfying Assumption 4.1). We can easily compute the unique clearing wealths under xǫ as
V ǫ(0) = (0, ǫ, 0)⊤ and V ǫ(1) = (0, 3/16, 0)⊤. We note that this clearing solution is identical to
the first clearing wealths solution of the static system and is independent of the choice of ǫ.
Example 4.10. Finally, we want to consider a simple financial system to demonstrate the issues
discussed in Section 3.3 surrounding the static framework. We will then use this same network
in the discrete time framework to find a unique, financially meaningful, clearing solution. To
do so, consider a bank who takes out an insurance payment on its own losses. As discussed in
Section 3.3, while the insured bank may, rightly, assume that their total losses will be made
whole, in a static setting this will not happen. However, in the dynamic framework this does
occur appropriately.
Consider the network with n = 3 banks, and without the societal node, depicted in Figure
3. That is, bank 1 begins with x1 = 1, bank 2 with x2 = 0, and bank 3 with x3 = 2 in
external assets. We consider the case in which L12 ≡ 2 and L23 ≡ 1.5 are fixed obligations
whereas the first bank has purchased insurance on their own losses from the third institution,
i.e. L31(V ) = V
−
1 . No other exposures exist within this system. The system of wealths must
therefore satisfy
V1 = 1 + (V
−
1 − V
−
3 )
+ − 2
V2 = (2− V
−
1 )
+ − 1.5
V3 = 2 + (1.5− V
−
2 )
+ − V −1 .
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Without the insurance payment, the first bank will default with wealths of V = (−1,−0.5, 3)⊤.
However, if the insurance is paid out in full then the first bank is made whole and the resultant
wealths are V = (0, 0.5, 2.5). In this case, the first bank does not default, which raises the
question whether any insurance payment is to be made at all. Neither of these are clearing
solutions as the system would infinitely cycle between needing insurance or not. The clearing
wealths, instead, are given by V = (−0.5, 0, 3)⊤. That is, bank 1 will have a shortfall midway
between its wealth with and without the insurance being paid. This, though, is not the notion
that a firm purchasing insurance would expect as it cannot make them whole.
x1 = 1 x2 = 0 x3 = 2
L12 ≡ 2 L23 ≡ 1.5
L31(V ) = V
−
1
Figure 3: Example 4.10: A graphical representation of the network model with 3 banks which has
poor interpretation in a static setting.
Now we wish to consider the same example but in the discrete time framework with T =
{0, 1}. Here we will consider all possible divisions of the external assets over the two time points.
Formally, define xǫ(0) = (ǫ, 0, 1)⊤ and xǫ(1) = (1− ǫ, 0, 1)⊤ for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, by the
topology of this network, it is a regular network (as defined in [17]) for any choice of ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
as required by Assumption 4.1. In any scenario, define L12(0) = 2 and L23(0) = 1.5 with no
other obligations at time 0. The only new obligation owed at time 1 is the contingent payment
from bank 3 to 1, i.e., L31(1, V0) = V1(0)
− with no other new obligations at time 1. Further,
all scenarios will be assumed to start from zero wealths (thus satisfying Assumption 4.1). We
can easily compute the unique clearing wealths under xǫ (assuming no firms are removed from
the system) as V ǫ(0) = (ǫ − 2, ǫ − 1.5, ǫ + 1)⊤ and (noting that V ǫ1 (0) < 0 for any ǫ ∈ [0, 1])
V ǫ(1) = (1 − ǫ, 0.5, 1.5 + ǫ)⊤. We note that, in the case that ǫ = 1, this clearing solution is
identical to the proposed static wealths when the insurance is paid in full. As opposed to the
prior examples, here the final wealths are a function of ǫ.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we consider an extension of the network model of [17] to include contingent
payments viz. insurance and CDSs with endogenous reference entities. We first study these
contingent payments in a static, simultaneous claims, framework and develop conditions to
provide existence and uniqueness of the clearing wealths. Further, sensitivity analysis and
financial implications are considered in this setting. We find that the static framework is suitable
only for a certain class of networks and we cannot guarantee the existence of a clearing solution
beyond these systems. Indeed the problem often becomes ill-defined from a financial standpoint.
Hence we introduce the dynamic framework and show that we can get existence and uniqueness
under very mild assumptions. Further we show that the problems which could not be solved in
the simultaneous claims framework can be studied with this dynamic approach.
A clear extension of this model would be to include illiquid assets as discussed in, e.g.,
[4, 21, 23] along with financial derivatives on these illiquid assets, i.e., options. These derivatives
fall under the general class of contingent payments and can be used a tool for either hedging
(insurance) or speculation. Due to the possibility of speculation, in such a setting a firm may
have incentives to attempt to precipitate a fire sale and collect profit from the derivatives.
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A Proof of Proposition 3.17
Proof. Firstly, as in (6), the clearing wealths as a function of initial endowments are defined by
V (x) = x+Π(V (x))⊤[p¯(V (x)) − V (x)−]+ − p¯(V (x)).
We will prove continuity by utilizing the closed graph theorem (see, e.g., [2, Theorem 2.58])
noting that Proposition 3.6 provides us with the condition that the clearing wealths map into a
compact set. Theorem 4 of [34] immediately provides the monotonicity of the clearing wealths.
Fix x ∈ Rn+1+ and let X = x+ [−1, 1]
n+1 be a closed compact neighborhood of x in the full
Euclidean space Rn+1. Then we can define V x : X → Rn+1 as the restriction (and possible
expansion to negative terms) of the domain of V to X . The graph of V x is given by:
graphV x =

(xˆ, Vˆ ) ∈ X ×
∏
i∈N0
[xi − 1−
∑
j∈N0
L¯ij , xi + 1 +
∑
j∈N
L¯ji] | Vˆ = xˆ+Π(Vˆ )
⊤[p¯(Vˆ )− Vˆ −]+ − p¯(Vˆ )

 .
To see that graphV x is closed let (xˆk, Vˆ k)k∈N ⊆ graphV
x → (xˆ, Vˆ ), then immediately
Vˆ = lim
k→∞
Vˆ k = lim
k→∞
[
xˆk +Π(Vˆ k)⊤[p¯(Vˆ k)− (Vˆ k)−]+ − p¯(Vˆ k)
]
= xˆ+Π(Vˆ )⊤[p¯(Vˆ )−Vˆ −]+−p¯(Vˆ )
by continuity of the nominal liabilities matrix L. Therefore by the closed graph theorem we
immediately recover that V x is continuous for any x ∈ Rn+1+ , which implies that V is continuous
at any x as well and thus V : Rn+1+ → R
n+1 is a continuous mapping.
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